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Interests of Amici Curiae
The States have a strong interest in ensuring that their citizens enjoy access to
the free flow of information and ideas in “the modern public square” that is the social media marketplace. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737 (2017).
But the social-media ecosystem, run by an increasingly small number of large companies who function as the gatekeepers of online content, threatens the States’ ability to meet this salutary goal. That marketplace is susceptible to well-documented
arbitrariness, censorship, and other forms of editorial abuse at the hands of these
gatekeepers, many of which are members of Plaintiffs’ trade associations. See, e.g.,
App.891-1693 (collecting examples).
To remedy this situation, many States are examining this problem and have been
considering legislation that aims to restore order and fairness to the social-media
market. See, e .g., Hearing, Free Speech & Social Media: H. Comm. on Sci. & Tech.,
2021 Leg. (Ga. May 20, 2021); Social Media Censorship Complaint Form, Ala. Attorney Gens. Office, https://tinyurl.com/nb8rpz3j (last accessed Sept. 14, 2021); Social
Media Complaint Form, Attorney Gen. Jeff Landry, La. Dep’t of Justice, https://tinyurl.com/338meu8h (last accessed Sept. 14, 2021). By one count, “[a]t least 30
state legislatures have introduced some form of a content-moderation bill in this
[past] legislative session.” Jennifer Huddleston & Liam Fulling, Examining State
Tech Policy Actions in 2021, Am. Action Forum (July 21, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/2vhftt42.
Some States have already enacted such legislation. Texas, for example, recently
passed, and Governor Abbott signed into law, H.B. 20. See Act of Sept. 2, 2021, 87th

Leg., 2d C.S., H.B. 20 (to be codified at Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §143a.002).
That law forbids social media platforms to “censor a user, a user’s expression, or a
user’s ability to receive the expression of another person based on” viewpoint or
geographic location. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 143a.002 (to be codified per
H.B. 20, supra, § 7). It also requires social media platforms to provide written notice
to users if their content is removed, explain the reason for that removal, and publicly
disclose their content moderation practices. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§ 120.051,
120.103(a) (to be codified per H.B. 20, supra, § 2).
Texas is not alone. Florida’s S.B. 7072—the law at issue in this appeal—contains similar provisions to Texas’s H.B. 20. A neutrality provision requires social
media platforms to “apply censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning standards in a consistent manner among its users on the platform.” Fla. Stat.
§ 501.2041(2)(b). 1 And disclosure provisions require social media platforms to
“publish the standards . . . used for determining how to censor, deplatform, and
shadow ban,” id. § 501.2041(2)(a), and to notify users when they are censored, deplatformed, or shadow banned, id. § 501.2041(2)(d).

1

“Censor” is defined as “any action taken by a social media platform to delete,
regulate, restrict, edit, alter, inhibit the publication or republication of, suspend a
right to post, remove, or post an addendum to any content or material posted by a
user.” Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(1)(b). “Deplatform” is defined as “the action or practice by a social media platform to permanently delete or ban a user or to temporarily
delete or ban a user from the social media platform for more than 14 days.” Id.
§ 501.2041(1)(c). And a “shadow ban” is “action by a social media platform . . . to
limit or eliminate the exposure of a user or content or material posted by a user to
other users of the social media platform.” Id. § 501.2041(1)(f).
2

These provisions of S.B. 7072—along with many of that bill’s other provisions—were preliminarily enjoined by the district court in this case, in part on the
ground that S.B. 7072 implements content-based restrictions on speech that violate
the First Amendment. But the district court’s First Amendment analysis is riddled
with errors. It veered off course from the outset by concluding that S.B. 7072 regulates speech, when that law instead regulates conduct that is unprotected by the First
Amendment: social media platforms’ arbitrary application of their content moderation policies. The district court also mistook S.B. 7072 for a content-based law and
subjected it to strict scrutiny when the law is in fact content-neutral and therefore
subject to more deferential constitutional review. Finally, in assessing the governmental interest in S.B. 7072, the court completely ignored the States’ long-established compelling interest in ensuring that its citizens have access to the free flow of
information and ideas.
If the district court’s faulty analysis is not corrected by this Court, the errant
legal theories it endorsed could be adopted by other courts around the country and
imperil similar laws such as Texas’s H.B. 20 and those that may soon be enacted into
law throughout the country. The States thus have a keen interest in this case, and
they submit this brief to aid the Court in resolving these novel constitutional issues.

Argument
I. S.B. 7072’s Neutrality and Disclosure Provisions Do Not Regulate
Protected First Amendment Activity.
The First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause forbids the government to “restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
3

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015) (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). This prohibition extends not only to laws “telling people
what they must say,” but also to certain “conduct that is inherently expressive.”
Rumsfeld v. Forum of Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 61, 66 (2006)
(“FAIR”). The Supreme Court has recognized such conduct as including saluting a
flag (and refusing to do so), West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632
(1943), wearing an armband to protest a war, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969), displaying a red flag, Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931), and even “[m]arching, walking, or parading” in uniforms
displaying the swastika, Nat. Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1997).
See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995).
Aside from these core First Amendment activities, however, the Free Speech
Clause allows States to legislate with a freer hand. As relevant here, “the First
Amendment does not prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct from
imposing incidental burdens on speech.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552,
567 (2011). And in this case, S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions, see Fla.
Stat. § 501.2041(2)(a), (2)(d)(1), (2)(e), do not run afoul of the First Amendment.
These statutory requirements regulate conduct—the disjointed and arbitrary manner in which Plaintiffs’ members apply content-moderation standards. At most,
these provisions impose an incidental burden on speech. And for that reason, the
district court erred in applying the First Amendment to Florida’s S.B.7072.

4

A. Social Media Platforms’ Content-Moderation Practices Are Conduct, Not Speech.
Nothing in S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions regulates the speech
of Plaintiffs or the members of their trade associations—they “neither limit[] what
[Plaintiffs or their members] may say nor require[] them to say anything.” FAIR,
547 U.S. at 60. Instead, at most these provisions regulate the conduct of Plaintiffs and
their members: their arbitrary and blunderbuss content-moderation policies. See,
e.g., Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b) (“[a] social media platform must apply censorship,
deplatforming, and shadow banning standards in a consistent manner among its users on the platform”).
The Supreme Court’s decision in FAIR is instructive. There the Court considered whether a congressional statute requiring institutions of higher education to allow military recruiters on their campuses comported with the First Amendment.
FAIR, 547 U.S. at 51. In holding that it did, the Court reasoned that the statute “regulates conduct, not speech.” Id. at 60. That was because the statute “affects what
law schools must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they may
or may not say.” Id. The same is true here. Like the law-school plaintiffs at issue in
FAIR, here Plaintiffs’ members “remain free . . . to express whatever views they may
have.” Id. S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions, therefore, only affect
what Plaintiffs’ members “do” in the context of content moderation, “not what they
may or may not say.” Id.

5

B. Social Media Platforms’ Content-Moderation Practices Are Not
“Inherently Expressive” Conduct.
Even if a particular law does not regulate speech as such, certain “inherently
expressive” conduct may nonetheless qualify for First Amendment protection. Id.
at 66-67 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)). To determine whether
such conduct is “sufficiently expressive” to merit First Amendment protection, this
Court considers: “(1) whether ‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present;’ and (2) whether ‘in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.’” Fort Lauderdale
Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). Plaintiffs’ members’ content
moderation practices do not satisfy either element.
1. Plaintiffs’ attempt to cloak their preference for arbitrary censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning in the First Amendment falters from the first step:
neither Plaintiffs nor the district court has ever identified a “particularized message”
that Plaintiffs or its members wish to present. Id. While “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,” Hurley, 515 U.S. at
569, there must be some message that the speaker “inten[ds] to convey,” cf. Fort
Lauderdale Food, 901 F.3d at 1240 (identifying one message intended to be conveyed
as “society can end hunger and poverty if we redirect our collective resources from
the military and war”).” No such message has been identified here.
Far from identifying a message that they wish to convey through arbitrary application of their content-moderation policies, Plaintiffs’ members have repeatedly—
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and very publicly—abjured the notion that they are expressing any message, articulating a viewpoint, or conveying a political ideology while engaged in content moderation. Consider the example of Twitter. Its CEO, Jack Dorsey, has explained: “Are
we doing something according to political ideology or viewpoints? We are not. Period
. . . . We do not look at content with regards to political viewpoint or ideology. We
look at behavior.” Brian Stelter, Twitter’s Jack Dorsey: ‘We are not’ discriminating
against any political viewpoint, CNN (Aug. 20, 2018), https://tinyurl.com/fe8jw9e8
(insisting that policies “look at content” not speech). The company has assured a
committee of the U.S. House of Representatives that its rules “are not based on ideology or a particular set of beliefs” but instead “based on behavioral contexts.” Facebook, Google and Twitter: Examining the Content Filtering Practices of Social Media
Giants: Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2018) (statement
of Nick Pickles, Senior Strategist, Public Policy, Twitter, Inc.). And it has likewise
informed a subcommittee of the United States Senate that “Twitter does not use
political viewpoints, perspectives, or party affiliation to make any decisions, whether
related to automatically ranking content on our service or how we develop or enforce
our rules.” Stifling Free Speech: Technological Censorship and the Public Discourse:
Hearing Before Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1
(2019) (responses to questions for the record for Carlos Monje, Jr., Director of Public Policy & Philanthropy, U.S. & Canada, Twitter, Inc.).
Twitter is not alone. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg has stated that Facebook
would not “take down political advertisements on the social network even if the ads
contain false information” and that to do so would be “an infringement on free
7

speech.” Mike Snider, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg Says the Social Network Should
Not be ‘Censoring Politicians,’ USA Today (Dec. 2, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/4ae66m9a. Similarly, Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai testified before Congress that Alphabet’s companies, like Google and YouTube, “strive to have clear
and transparent policies and enforce them without regard to political party or point
of view.” Disinformation Nation: Social Media’s Role in Promoting Extremism and Misinformation: Joint Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy & Com., 117th Cong. 8 (2021)
(statement of Sundar Pichai, CEO, Alphabet, Inc.). And representatives from TikTok have emphatically stated that the company “does not moderate content due to
political sensitivities.” Will Feuer, TikTok Says it Doesn’t Censor Content, but a User
was Just Locked Out After a Viral Post Criticizing China, CNBC (Nov. 26, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/t2ajzjb5.
Despite a dearth of evidence supporting the notion that Plaintiffs or their members intend to convey a message, the district court resisted this conclusion by characterizing their arbitrary content-moderation policies as the “exercise [of] editorial
judgment” in “ideologically sensitive cases,” and by citing three purportedly analogous cases that limit the government’s ability to force one speaker to host or accommodate another speaker’s message. App.1716 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), Hurley, 515 U.S. at 557, and Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub.
Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S.1 (1986)).
The key flaw in the district court’s analysis is that the First Amendment violation in those three cases “resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker’s own
message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate.” FAIR, 547 U.S.
8

at 63 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs’ members have disclaimed the
intent to express a message in conjunction with their hosting of user-generated content. Supra at 6-8. For that reason, S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions
are nothing like a statutory requirement that a newspaper’s editorial page afford a
political candidate equal space to reply to criticism levied by the paper’s editors.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243-45. They are not comparable to forcing the organizers of a
St. Patrick’s Day Parade—which is an inherently expressive activity—to include
participants whose own activity would detract from the “particularized message”
that the parade organizers want to convey about “what merits celebration on that
day.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569, 574. And they are far afield of a regulatory requirement
that a utility company include a third party’s newsletter alongside its own newsletters, which were sent to customers and which had been long used to disseminate
“political editorials, feature stories on matters of public interest, tips on energy conservation, and straightforward information about utility services and bills.” Pac. Gas
& Elec., 475 U.S. at 5-7. Put simply, Plaintiffs’ conduct “lack[s] the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the editorial page of a newspaper.” FAIR, 547 U.S.
at 64.
Instead of Tornillo, Hurley, and Pacific Gas & Electric, the circumstances of this
case are analogous to the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in FAIR. There, the
Court upheld against a First Amendment challenge a congressional statute requiring
institutions of higher education to allow military recruiters on their campuses. Id. at
51. In response to arguments by an association of law schools that the statute violated
the First Amendment because it was tantamount to compelling their speech, the
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Court held that the statute “regulates conduct, not speech.” Id. at 60. The Court
observed that the statute at issue “does not dictate the content of the speech at all”
and that any burden on the plaintiffs’ speech was “plainly incidental to the . . . regulation of conduct.” Id. at 62. After all, “the schools are not speaking when they host
interviews and recruiting receptions.” Id. at 64. And “send[ing] e-mails and
post[ing] notices on behalf of the military” is the type of “incidental” burden on
speech that is a “far cry” from what the Court has held abridges a party’s right to
free speech. Id. at 61-62.
The same is true here. S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions do not
regulate, much less dictate the content of, the “speech” of Plaintiffs or their members; they only regulate “conduct”—arbitrary application of content moderation
policies. See Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b) (“[a] social media platform must apply censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning standards in a consistent manner among
its users on the platform”). Moreover, social media platforms like Facebook and
Twitter are not themselves speaking when they provide a platform for hosting the
speech of their users. See FAIR, 547 U.S. at 64. And the requirements that Plaintiffs’
members apply any deplatforming, censorship, and shadow banning in an evenhanded manner and provide disclosures to affected users, Fla. Stat.
§ 501.2041(2)(a), (2)(d)(1), (2)(e), are akin to the “incidental” burden on speech
visited upon the law schools in FAIR who had to send e-mails and post notices about
military recruiting.
2. For similar reasons, Plaintiffs cannot show that “the surrounding circumstances would lead the reasonable observer to view the conduct as conveying some
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sort of message.” Fort Lauderdale Food, 901 F.3d at 1242. At least with regard to
platforms like Facebook and Twitter, which claim only to seek to connect their billions of users with one another, the “likelihood” that any “message would be understood by those who viewed it” is nonexistent. Id. at 1240. When an individual uses
Google or Bing to search for instructions on how to change a tire, he or she is not
expecting the results returned to convey some message from Google or Bing, and,
unsurprisingly, does not see one.
This conclusion is consistent with the nature of social-media platforms. Courts
of Appeals agree that, generally, social media sites “use[] features and functions,
including algorithms, to analyze user posts and recommend other user groups.” Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 894 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Those “functions—recommendations and notifications—were tools meant to facilitate the communication and content of others, and not content in and of themselves.” Id.
(cleaned up). When a social media provider treats speakers the same and “employ[s]
neutral tools,” they are simply “match[ing] what [they] know[] about users based
on their historical actions and send[ing] third-party content to users that [they] anticipate[] they will prefer.” Id. at 894-95. For that reason, courts routinely reject
claims that speech by users of the social-media sites is indistinguishable from the
speech of the platform itself. See id. (rejecting at the pleading stage an argument that
Google “creat[es] and develop[s]” ISIS content that appears on YouTube); Force v.
Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 76–78 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2761 (2020)
(rejecting claim that Facebook “‘develop[s]’ the content of the Facebook postings
by Hamas”); cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 655 (1994) (“Given
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cable’s long history of serving as a conduit for broadcast signals, there appears little
risk that cable viewers would assume that the broadcast stations carried on a cable
system convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator.”). This Court
should do the same.

II. S.B. 7072’s Neutrality and Disclosure Provisions Do Not Impose Content-Based Restrictions.
The district court’s conclusion that S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure and
provisions violate the First Amendment is erroneous for a second reason: those provisions are not content-based regulations subject to strict scrutiny. Contra App.171819. “Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”
Reed, 576 U.S. at 163. But because S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure provisions
are content-neutral, the district court should have never applied strict scrutiny. See
Fly Fish, Inc. v. City of Cocoa Beach, 337 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (contentneutral laws are “entitled to a deferential, or intermediate, level of constitutional
scrutiny”).
“Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Reed, 576
U.S. at 163. Some laws are facially content-based, “defining regulated speech by particular subject matter” or “by its function or purpose.” Id. Others are facially content-neutral but will be considered “content-based” either because they “cannot be
‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech’” or because they
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“were adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the
speech] conveys.’” Id. at 164. Still others are truly content-neutral: “laws that confer
benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 643; see also Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public property “is neutral—indeed it is
silent—concerning any speaker’s point of view”); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981) (State fair regulation requiring that sales
and solicitations take place at designated locations “applies evenhandedly to all who
wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds”).
In this case, S.B. 7072’s neutrality and disclosure requirements are content neutral. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b). These regulations do not “draw distinctions based
on the message a speaker conveys,” Reed, 576 U.S. at 163, but instead are “silent . . .
concerning any speaker’s point of view,” Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 804. The
neutrality provision, for example, requires a social media platform to “apply censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning standards in a consistent manner among its
users on the platform.” Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(b) (emphasis added). Likewise, the
disclosure provisions merely require social media platforms to “publish the standards . . . used for determining how to censor, deplatform, and shadow ban,” id.
§ 501.2041(2)(a), and to notify users when they are censored, deplatformed, or
shadow banned, id. § 501.2041(2)(e).
These provisions are quintessential content-neutral regulations: they “confer
benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views
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expressed.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 643. And “[n]othing in [them] imposes a restriction,
penalty, or burden by reason of the views” that the social media platform “has selected or will select.” Id. at 644. After all, these provisions neither forbid nor encourage social media platforms to censor, deplatform, or shadow ban—they merely require those companies to apply content-moderation standards in a consistent way
and provide notice to users who are subjected to such censorship, deplatforming, or
shadow banning. In other words, these provisions can be applied—indeed, are written to be applied—“without reference to the content of [any] regulated speech.”
Reed, 576 U.S. at 164.
The district court did not single out the neutrality or disclosure provisions as
content-based, but it nevertheless concluded that every subsection of section 540.2041 was content-based and must be enjoined. 2 It appears to have done so
for two reasons. First, it concluded that the statute’s definition of “social media platform” only makes S.B. 7072 applicable to companies with $100 million in revenues
or 100 million monthly participants, and this is a “tell for content discrimination.”
App.1720. Second, the district court inferred from statements of legislators that the
“actual motivation for this legislation was hostility to social media platforms’
2

Though the district court pointed to other provisions of S.B. 7072 besides its
neutrality and disclosure provisions to establish that the law as a whole is contentbased, App.1719, an analysis of those provisions are outside the scope of this brief.
To the extent that this Court believes that other provisions of S.B. 7072 are unconstitutional, the constitutionally sound provisions—like the neutrality and disclosure
requirements—should be severed. See Coral Springs Street Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise,
371 F.3d 1320, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Florida law clearly favors (where possible)
severance of the invalid portions of a law from the valid ones.”).
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perceived liberal viewpoint.” App.1719. Neither of these rationales can justify the
district court’s sweeping, overbroad injunction.
1. In support of the conclusion that S.B. 7072 is content-based in toto because it
only regulates large social media platforms, the district court relied principally on a
single statement from Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission that “[s]peech
restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to
control content.” 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010); see App.1720-21. But this solitary statement, plucked out of context, has no application here. In the immediately preceding
sentence, the Supreme Court makes clear that laws drawing distinctions among
speakers are constitutionally suspect not in the abstract but only when the effect is
to “allow[] speech by some [speakers] but not others.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at
340; see also Turner, 512 U.S. at 658 (“speaker-based laws demand strict scrutiny
when they reflect the Government’s preference for the substance of what the favored
speakers have to say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to say)”). Yet
S.B. 7072’s definition of “social media platform” hardly “allow[s] speech by some
but not others.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. It merely defines the class of entities who may be subject to the law’s restrictions. Nor do S.B. 7072’s neutrality and
disclosure provisions restrict the speech of some parties and not others; as described
above, they merely require even-handed application of content-moderation standards and disclosure to users affected by their application. Supra at 13-14.
The flaw in the district court’s reasoning is laid bare by consideration of the Supreme Court’s decision in Turner. There the Supreme Court upheld against a First
Amendment challenge FCC regulations requiring “cable operators to carry the
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signals of a specified number of local broadcast television stations.” Turner, 512 U.S.
at 630. The Court concluded that the must-carry provisions were content-neutral
even though they only applied to cable operators with more than 300 subscribers. Id.
at 644 (“the rules impose obligations upon all operators, save those with fewer than
300 subscribers”). The fact that the FCC’s must-carry rules drew distinctions
among cable operators by size simply did not raise an issue of constitutional import.
The same is true here.
2. The district court also erred by justifying its decision to enjoin S.B. 7072 in its
entirety by speculating that “the actual motivation for this legislation was hostility
to the social media platforms’ perceived liberal viewpoint.” App.1719. To be sure,
facially-neutral laws may be deemed content-based when they are “adopted by the
government ‘because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.’”
Reed, 576 U.S. at 164 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989)). But here, the district court’s attempt to divine such a legislative purpose
from statements of legislators that were collected in a press release by Governor DeSantis’s office is flawed as both a legal and factual matter. See News Release, Office
of Ron DeSantis, 46th Governor of Florida, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop
the Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech (May 24, 2021), https://tinyurl.com/2a49nbc2.
Legally, this argument is foreclosed by United States v. O’Brien. There, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to mine the legislative history of a federal statute, challenged on First Amendment grounds, that prohibited the burning of
draft cards. 391 U.S. 367, 383-86 (1968). In concluding that such a free-floating
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inquiry into legislative purpose had no proper place in the First Amendment analysis,
the Court held that “[i]nquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter” particularly where a court is “asked to void a statute that is, under wellsettled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful
of Congressmen said about it.” Id. at 383-84. That is because “[w]hat motivates one
legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores
of others to enact it.” Id.at 384; see also Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc.,
545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“[j]udicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become . . . an exercise in looking over a crowd and picking out your
friends”); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“We have eschewed reliance on the passing comments of one Member, and casual statements from the floor
debates.” (cleaned up)).
Factually, even if snippets of statements made by a handful of legislators constituted legally competent evidence of the collective intent of all of Florida’s 160 legislators—and they do not—those statements do not show an intent to regulate content
“because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys.” Reed, 576 U.S.
at 164. Far from “suppress[ing] disfavored speech,” id. at 167, these legislators’
statements evince a desire to expand the range of ideas hosted on social media platforms. Were it otherwise, one would expect to see statements from legislators extoling the law’s ability to squelch disfavored political viewpoints. But the opposite is
true. For example, the Lieutenant Governor is quoted as praising the law’s purpose
of reversing the trend of “silenc[ing], intimidat[ing], and wip[ing] out dissenting
voices” and restoring the “virtual public square as a place where information and
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ideas can flow freely.” News Release, supra at 16. The Senate President noted that
the law would safeguard the “right to express opposing views” and forestall “unfair
and arbitrary discrimination on social media platforms.” Id. The Speaker of the
House lauded S.B. 7072’s purpose of “protect[ing] the free speech of Floridians and
demand[ing] transparency” from social medial platforms. Id. And Senator Rodrigues explained that S.B. 7072 will help to instill “fair[ness] and transparen[cy]”
in the practices of social media platforms—“regardless of our political ideology.” Id.
Evidence of censorious intent these statements are not. The district court thus
clearly erred in pointing to statements of legislators exalting the benefits of unbiased
content moderation and the free flow of ideas to support the notion that S.B. 7072
was somehow intended to facilitate viewpoint discrimination.

III. States Have a Compelling Interest in Ensuring their Citizens Enjoy
Access to the Free Flow of Information and Ideas.
The district court further erred by giving short shrift to the compelling interest
that Florida is seeking to advance through S.B. 7072—namely, ensuring that its citizens enjoy access to the free flow of information and ideas, unencumbered by arbitrary and erratic censorship, deplatforming, and shadow banning. The district court
perfunctorily asserted that “levelling the playing field—promoting speech on one
side of an issue or restricting speech on the other—is not a legitimate state interest.”
App.1722. But that is flatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition that
“assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First
Amendment.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court has long
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observed that “the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public.” United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (plurality op.).
S.B. 7072 is directed precisely to vindicating this governmental interest. The
bill’s legislative findings recognize that social media platforms “have transformed
into the new public town square” and “hold a unique place in preserving first amendment protections for all Floridians.” S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021)
(enacted). Despite this, the Legislature notes, social media platforms have “unfairly
censored, shadow banned, deplatformed, and applied post-prioritization algorithms
to Floridians.” Id. As a result, and because “[t]he state has a substantial interest in
protecting its residents from inconsistent and unfair actions by social media platforms,” S.B. 7072 enacts a variety of provisions designed to secure Floridians’ right
to access “public opinion” through the free flow of ideas. Id. As discussed, included
among these statutory protections are S.B. 7072’s neutrality provision—aimed at
ensuring that social media platforms apply content-moderation policies consistently—and its disclosure provisions—aimed at informing users when they are subjected to censorship, deplatforming, or shadow banning. Fla. Stat. § 501.2041(2)(a),
(2)(d)(1), (2)(e).
Safeguarding this interest is particularly urgent in the context of social media
platforms, which have become “the modern public square.” Packingham, 137 S. Ct.
at 1737. Unlike a traditional newspaper, and more akin to a cable operator, social media platforms “exercise[] . . . great[] control over access to the relevant medium”
and possess the power “to obstruct readers’ access to” information and even
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“prevent” the distribution of certain information that the y do not like.
Turner, 512 U.S. at 656. Thus, “[b]y virtue of its ownership of the essential
pathway,” a social media platform “can . . . silence the voice of competing
speakers with a mere flick of the switch.” Id. “The potential for abuse of this
private power over a central avenue of communication cannot be overlooked.” Id.
at 657; see also Matthew P. Hooker, Censorship, Free Speech & Facebook: Applying
the First Amendment to Social Media Platforms Via the Public Function Exception, 15
Wash. J. L. Tech. & Arts 36, 43-44 (2019) (collecting examples of “arbitrary”
application of content-moderation policies by social media platforms). Accordingly,
“[t]he First Amendment’s command that government not impede the freedom of
speech does not disable the government from taking steps to ensure that private
interests not restrict, through physical control of a critical pathway of
communication, the free flow of information and ideas.” Turner, 512 U.S. at 657.
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Conclusion
The Court should reverse the district court’s order preliminarily enjoining the
neutrality and disclosure provisions of S.B. 7072.
Respectfully submitted.
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